When it comes to non-violent Islamists, one of the most recurring dilemmas among Western policymakers and security officials is whether or not governments should cooperate with seemingly non-violent Islamist groups in the fight against violent extremism. Essentially, there are two schools of thought: the “conveyor belt” school and the “firewall” school. Conveyor belt theorists insist that any partnership should be avoided. To them, non-violent Islamists are crucial enablers of terrorism and precursors to violence – for their incubated religiously-sanctioned intolerance would contribute to the justification of violent actions [1]. On the other hand, firewall proponents argue that the doctrines and ideology of violent and non-violent Islamists are radically different, and that the latter would be credible allies that may prevent otherwise vulnerable Muslims from descending down a path of terrorism [2].

The United Kingdom seems to be the best example to describe such a quandary. For some, not only should non-violent Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Hizb ut Tahir not be deemed as political threats, even if they promote intolerance and anti-democratic worldviews [3]; in truth, they are perceived as credible interlocutors who may help in addressing important domestic and international challenges [4]. For instance, reports by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) urge the British government to increasingly engage with the Muslim Brotherhood, claiming it may contribute to the development of concrete political reforms in North Africa and Middle East [5], creating channels for serious and sustained dialogue with existing mainstream Islamist organisations there [6]. Further, given that non-violent extremists often share certain core ideas with their violent counterparts, they are often believed to have a greater credibility among those individuals who are more at risk of falling pray to violent radicalisation [7]. For this reasons, a number of British security officials consider non-violent extremists to be more suitable partners in countering domestic violent extremism than genuine “moderate” Muslims [8].

The Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) is perhaps the most notable example of effective collaboration between police and non-violent Islamists. In the early 2000s, this unit of the London Metropolitan Police worked closely with the British branch of the Muslim Brotherhood to regain control of the Finsbury Park Mosque in North London, which was ruled by a group of violent extremists linked to Al-Qaeda [9]. In the years that followed, the MCU built strong and effective partnerships with the Brixton Salafis, an openly anti-violence Islamist group juxtaposing London-based violent extremists meant to prevent radicalisation among vulnerable local young Muslims [10].

Yet, despite the ostensible success of these collaborations, various pundits have strongly warned against the establishment of such tactical alliances, claiming they may do more harm than good, especially in the long-term [11]. In this regard, there are two main reasons why state engagement with non-violent extremists should be avoided. First and foremost, official collaborations may allow Islamist groups who hold uncompromising theocratic worldviews to obtain more political influence and legitimacy within their respective communities [12]. This, in turn, may pose a twofold threat to liberal democracies: Not only may such partnerships whet the appetite of non-violent Islamists, allowing them to impose their demands on governments for their own political agendas [13]; in the long run, these partnerships could contribute to the legitimisation and creation of mainstream movements that could attract mass support [14], gain power through liberal elections, and “destroy democracy without a single shot being fired” [15].

The failure to recognise controversial intentions behind presumed non-violent Islamist groups is what makes proponents of state engagement worthy of criticism [16]. As Alex Schimd points out, violent and non-violent Islamists are two sides of the same coin [17]. They both share extremist versions of Islam that shun democracy and see the establishment of a sharia-based state as the solution to all the plagues affecting the global ummah [18]. The only difference between them lies in the strategy and tactics they adopt to advance their goals [19]. Whilst large insurgent organisations such as the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, or the Taliban practice violence and terrorism in the name of jihad, movements professed to be non-violent, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut Tahir or Sharia4Belgium, “only” engage in political activism and missionary work [20]. However, it must be noticed that their decision to relinquish violence does not seem to be principled and absolute, but tends to be merely based on pragmatic and tactical considerations [21]. According to Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, there is indeed a strategic logic in choosing a non-violence path [22]. Liberal freedoms in democratic systems provide non-violent Islamists with freedom of manoeuvre, which is used to spread propaganda, recruit new members, and even perform street da’wa (proselytism) [23]. Moreover, as liberal states tend to perceive non-violent insurgents as less extreme than violent militants, even as they try to achieve the same goals [24], governments are more likely to take a positive attitude and accommodate the political demands of the former [25].

There is a second reason why liberal states should not officially engage with non-violent Islamist groups. While the claim that non-violent entities act as a “safety valve” against violent extremism is not proven, substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that they might actually contribute to the creation of a stable environment for violent radicalisation [26]. In fact, it is not uncommon for violent Islamists to have a history of non-violent extremism. As a recent study by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change on British jihadis reveals, nearly eight in ten militants (87/113) “had links to non-violent Islamism, whether by association with Islamist organisations or through connections to individuals who follow and spread extremist ideology” [27]. Analogously, a report published by the Centre for Social Cohesion indicates that approximately 15% of people arrested for terrorism-related offences in Great Britain in 2009 had links to al-Muhajiroun, an Islamist group that advocates for the introduction of sharia law in the UK [28]. Finally, a study by Raffaello Pantucci shows that almost half of individuals who perpetrated Jihadi-related attacks in Great Britain or abroad have had some sort of contact with non-violent Islamist movements [29]. Certainly, not all individuals involved in these groups automatically make the transition into violence. But it should be acknowledged that for those who do, the intolerant Islamist ideology professed in these non-violent groups is likely to be an ideological antechamber to violent extremism [30].

More than that, seemingly non-violent Islamist movements have provided direct ties with violent groups [31]. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, members of al-Muhajiroun established training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, actively recruiting individuals who would travel to various theatres of jihad. Anjem Choudary, one of the co-founders of the group, boldly boasted that they were sending people from Britain to Chechnya to join jihad against the Russians [32]. More recently, an Islamist movement called Sharia4Belgium engaged in a massive mobilisation spree of aspiring Belgian jihadists on their way to Syria and Iraq [33].