To demonstrate how propaganda primarily serves to terrorist movements as a tool to spread their ideology and recruit new sympathisers, one must employ both psychology and sociology to analyse all of its ramifications. One of the tripartite approaches of Social Movement Theory (SMT), Collective Framing Theory (CFT), whose key principle is to mobilise participants in social movements through a set of beliefs, offers a particularly interesting approach to analysing terrorist movement’s propaganda [12]. Frames are “specific metaphors (…) used to render or cast behaviour and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action” [13]. However, as Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen asserts, framing theory does not focus enough on the individual level of analysis [14], making it unlikely to figure out why some terrorist movements successfully acquire frame alignment with some individuals and not with others. Mayer Zald, a SMT scholar, does acknowledge that “culture, ideology, and strategic framing is our broadest and loosest conceptual cluster” [15]. Jan Christoffer Andersen and Sveinung Sandberg concur the idea that CFT is not enough by itself to understand the complexity of terrorist movements’ propaganda despite its relevance for studying social movements’ rhetoric [16]. They supplement the SMT approach with theories of subculture to analyse some of the underlying tensions in IS’ rhetoric [17]. Relying on Doob’s assumption that propaganda is a phenomenon with wide psychological implications and that the overarching narratives created by symbols give meaning to collective and individual experiences with regard to their everyday struggles, analysing propaganda necessitates the use of both psychology and sociology approaches [18].

To understand how propaganda enables terrorist movements to enforce their belief system upon potential recruits requires, one must firstly examine how propaganda works at the individual level. While terrorist movements frame their message to reach a large audience, only some individuals are drawn towards these movements [19]. Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance best allows us to observe the mechanics of propaganda on a person [20]. Festinger describes cognitive dissonance as “ an antecedent condition which leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction just as hunger leads to activity oriented toward hunger reduction” [21]. Dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable and will motivate an individual to thrive to reduce it and achieve consonance by altering/adjusting his behaviour. This what Abraham Maslow calls homeostasis, “the body’s automatic efforts to maintain a constant, normal state of the blood stream” [22]. The stronger the magnitude of the dissonance, the more determined the person is to reduce it [23]. Consistency theorists like Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell believe that the drive for consonance is a central motivator in behaviour and attitude formation [24].

This theory can be applied to propaganda because, as Festinger argues, “its manifestations may be observed in such a variety of contexts” [25]. A propagandist can generate feelings of dissonance and induce tension in a person’s behaviour and attitudes. The propagandist next offers a solution, a way of alleviating this dissonance, which is to comply to whatever request the propagandist has in mind [26].

Applying this to terrorist movements, one can assert they use propaganda as a way to create dissonance within individuals to force them to find a way to reduce the former. Certain individuals will then turn towards terrorist movements as a way to reach consonance. For instance, one can argue that IS’ overuse of extreme violence in its propaganda is a way for the movement to prevent the viewer from emotional relief. This leads some viewers to join the movement in order to alleviate the deeply-felt dissonance caused by the vision of extreme violence. Vivek Venkatesh et al., who analysed IS videos created between 2015 and 2016, demonstrate how IS overly emphasises the violence and follows up with more traumatic images in order to build over-stimulation and prevent the viewer from finding relief from the violent images [27]. As Kaplan demonstrates, emotional reactions to over-violent images are likely to remain disturbing for the viewer for some days [28]. Venkatesh et al. noticed that IS utilises techniques including abjection, horror and shock [29]. For instance, in the “Killing the Apostates In Revenge For the Monotheists #1–Wilāyat Khurāsān” video, IS members shoot two individuals in the head, then the scene is replayed in slow motion with an increased level of the gunshots’ sound. Finally, the camera stays on the victims’ bodies until they bleed out, giving time for the viewer to realise that a minute ago these individuals were alive [30]. When the overplaying of violence leads to the creation of dissonance, some viewers may pursue anti-social outcomes, including joining IS, as a way to reduce the dissonance created by propaganda materials.

On a collective level, propaganda can act as a way to create and reinforce what the sociologist Gustave Le Bon calls a collective soul, thereby facilitating recruitment [31]. Le Bon argues that individuals can at a precise point in time and under the influence of violent emotions gather and become a psychological crowd. When individuals are part of the crowd, their individual personality disappears to give place to thoughts and feelings determined by, in this instance, the propagandist [32]. Nader Barzin asserts that one of the main purpose of propaganda is to create herds of people so that they can act as one. Once this crowd, even if it is ephemeral, is created, the group’s mechanism takes over to direct the subjects’ thoughts and actions [33]. Similarly, SMT argues that social movements including terrorist ones use strategic frames to give a rationale for individual action within a group and to attach a certain meaning to an identified event/problem [34]. Propaganda allows terrorist movements to recruit and mobilise would-be sympathisers by enforcing their belief system upon them and thereby creating a “strong bond of esprit de corps” [35].

The analysis of IS’ material concurs this idea that terrorist movements may appeal to the collective soul/identity using propaganda. A primary example is IS’ use of anasheed, polyphonic songs from the Arabic musical and poetic tradition used in jihadist movement, in most of its propaganda videos [36]. Luis Velasco-Pufleau argues that anasheed can become collective symbols of an imaginary community of mujahideen that are aimed at inter alia building a collective memory and remembering martyrs [37]. In her sociological study of musical power, Tia De Nora demonstrates that music is dynamically related to social life and is a tool to establish a basis for collective action and set its parameters [38]. Rebecca W. Oettinger further asserts that songs themselves work as propaganda by disseminating a specific belief or mindset [39].

In the video discussing the 2015 Paris attacks, IS uses a nasheed called “Avance, Avance”, which aims to show the power of the Caliphate, motivating a collective identity, encouraging IS fighters to carry on their fight, and terrorising the enemy [40]. The nasheed’s lyrics reinforce this idea of the in- and out-group: “Either you kill them or they kill you, there is only profit!” or “Kill the traitors, attack them by surprise!” [41]. The nasheed accompanies the eristic text of foreign fighter Fabien Clain, on the Paris attacks. Clain’s text presents the dichotomy of we are the good guys. If you are not with us, you are our enemy to the audience. “And you, that doesn’t bother you? You still live with them, still work with them!”, says Clain [42]. Alexander Kinney et al. demonstrate in their analysis of IS propaganda that the movement explicitly focuses on a community and group level appeal [43]. IS constructs its propaganda to appeal to the audience’s collective soul, the brotherhood, by enforcing upon them its belief system so that they may join the movement.

Finally, propaganda allows terrorist movements to signal alternative forms of legitimacy so that they can distinguish themselves from rival movements and states. In his sociology of markets, Neil Fligstein argues that the major drive that holds a market together over a long period of time is the capability of firms to continue to enforce a conception of control vis-à-vis each other [44]. He adds that actors are required to strategically frame their firm’s action against their competitors and mobilise the resources to do so. He uses the “market-as-politics” metaphor to name the construct focusing on how social structures are created by firms to organize themselves and control competition across markets [45]. Less legitimate organisations, whether it is firms or terrorist movements, are more vulnerable to attacks by rivals, undermining their reputations and hindering their chance of survival [46]. According to the market-as-politics approach, propaganda is thus a way for terrorist movements to acquire legitimacy against rival movements and communicate their organisational identity to potential recruits.

Susan Olzak asserts that terrorist movements conveying a clear ideological identity are more likely to recruit as they are more easily interpretable entities [47]. Alexander B. Kinney et al.’s study of IS and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (APAQ)’s propaganda shows that IS and APAQ communicate, through respectively Dabiq/Rumiyah and Inspire, competing visions of legitimate terrorist activity [48]. Their findings suggest that terrorist movements actively articulate distinct themes under the umbrella of a broader ideology to would-be sympathisers using various symbols of terror [49]. Dabiq/Rumiyah is more than just a method of strategic communication for IS. It mostly serves to signal a distinct type of terrorism brand to a precise type of consumer (recruits), thereby creating a thematic contrast between this and other jihadist movements. This is what Kinney et al. calls “organizational adornment” [50].

Additionally, Fligstein argues that there are three phases in market formation, namely emergence, stability and crisis, and that each phase generates different kinds of politics [51]. When a firm arise in the market, if it is powerful enough, it will seek to enforce its view upon the broader market [52]. Fligstein argues that the most fluid phase in a market is when its emerges. No social relations have been established and the role of competitors have yet to be defined. Firms will try to take advantage of this situation and construct their tools of control [53]. One can say that IS emergence phase coincides with Abu Bakr al-Baghadadi being announced as IS’ Caliph on 29 June 2014 [54]. Winter’s study of IS propaganda reveals that between the 17 July 2015 and 15 August 2015, IS produced 892 propaganda events, which ranged from battlefield videos to photographic reports [55]. IS brand was also markedly more globalized in 2015 than in 2017 [56]. One can therefore argue that IS produced more propaganda material during that time frame as a way to enforce its brand upon the jihadist market and establish itself vis-à-vis its rivals.

During crisis, firms are susceptible to transformation and actors may reframe their strategic action vis-à-vis one another in order to promote their survival [57]. As Olzak argues, terrorist movements operate in unstable environments [58]. To reassert themselves vis-à-vis their competitors in times of crisis, terrorist movements may adapt their propaganda material. For instance, Winter noticed that between the 2015 summer and early 2017, IS experienced “a branding volte-face”, which corresponds with the increased external pressures, including territorial loss, faced by the movement in 2016 [59]. During IS’ market stability, namely summer 2015, the most common theme of its propaganda was utopia material depicting civilian life in the Caliphate [60]. Winter noticed the movement then shifted its narrative from utopia towards warfare and offensive operations [61]. One can say that terrorist movements’ propaganda is influenced by the phase in which the movement is and shift their propaganda’s narrative accordingly so that they can retain their legitimacy in the eyes of their challengers and recruits.