A structural augment claims that democratic regimes with extensive civil liberties are more prone to terrorism because they lower the associated cost of operation for a terrorist group. Schmidt in his article Terrorism and Democracy characterizes democracy as a system that is “ruled by the majority while respecting the right of the minority,” while terrorism “is an instrument of rule of a tyrannic minority whether in or out of power.” Through this contradiction, Schmidt claims that democracies are at a “tactical disadvantage” against violent groups such as terrorists because terrorism possess an “acceptability and effectiveness” in which the government has to choose between effective counter-terrorist policies or preserving “civil” or “political liberties [10].” According to the Rational Choice Theory, when the costs and risks that terror organizations use to operate are low, terrorism will be more likely to occur [11]. In a liberal democracy, freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of the press, the number of targets, legal constraints, and negative externalities that are associated with the rise of economic liberalism have become critical components of democratic societies that lower the cost for terrorists to operate. Institutional constraints prohibit the state from implementing draconian counter-terrorism strategies that might be otherwise implemented in undemocratic regimes without the total loss of regime legitimacy by the polity [12]. Pape claims that democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism because the polity within a democratic country is more sensitive to violence and is easily manipulated by violent organizations, especially when considering suicide terrorism tactics [13]. While not specifically mentioned in Pape, democratic “sensitivities” could come from the media exposure that is granted to terrorist organizations. Since terrorist organizations essentially want to “maximize publicity” in order to intimidate or coerce its target audience, liberal democracies with extensive press freedom could be beneficial to terrorist groups. For example, the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 by Hezbollah in 1985 and the finding that almost 80 percent of Americans who planned to travel abroad found overseas travel too dangerous after the hijacking supports Pape’s theory [14].

Unfortunately, Reiter and Wade found that there was almost no difference between regime types and suicide terrorism when they aggregated more data and used a more methodical analysis, largely putting Pape’s hypothesis in doubt [15]. Likewise, if Pape’s argument was sustainable we might see terrorists generally being more successful. Further research has concluded that only three out of 42 terrorist groups were “successful,” a seven percent success rate. This is primarily because terrorism “miscommunicates” political goals and gives the impression that terrorists want to destroy “societies” and “publics,” thereby eroding the prospect of the target state making concessions [16]. Concurrently, domestic terrorist groups may find the media counterproductive to their cause. While potentially trying to lure the democratic regime into repressive actions that would delegitimize the state, in stable democracies where political institutions are perceived as legitimate, actors such as terrorists that operate outside the means of normal political communication may lose support, become deprived of manpower and resources, and cease to exist [17]. However, in democratic institutions that are not perceived as legitimate, terrorist or violent non-state actors could find ample maneuverability and sympathy within at least a minority of the population [18]. Using McCarthy and Zald’s resource mobilization approach, it is possible to stipulate that democracies allow for easier social mobilization and resource accumulation through liberal democratic values that could potentially create groups that resort to terrorism [19]. Furthermore, democratic social mobilization could allow the population to sympathize and legitimize terrorist groups. For example, Hezbollah, a Lebanese terrorist organization, has continued to participate in Lebanese democratic political processes since 1992 despite advocating for a “radical Shi’ite Islamic caliphate dominated by Islamic law.” During this time, its political weight in the Lebanese government has grown without the organizing disavowing terrorism actions [20].

If terrorist groups are trying to amplify their voices using media to be on a “level playing field” with the state, then it might be possible that terrorist incidents happen in countries where social mobilization and protests frequently occur. Baker et al. found a positive significance between nonviolent protests and terrorist events and retorted that protests exacerbate the perceived weakness of the state and condition protest actors to “outbid” others to gain support, possibly leading to violence. Concurrently, the authors found that state coercion increases the perception of a strong state and reduced terrorism [21]. The strength of this argument potentially shows why some countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are attacked more often than countries with less social mobilization such as the Nordic countries and Japan [22]. Furthermore, it could be argued that transitioning democracies accrue more violence because “social mobilization” and “political consciousness” are increasing faster than “effective” and “legitimate” political institutions, creating “political decay” and terrorism [23]. Critics of this argument claim that it “overpredicts” terrorism because both democratic and autocratic countries with social mobilization do not always see terrorism. Further research is needed to see how social and political mobilization increases or decreases the likelihood of terrorism in societies [24].